Patterns of Personal and Political Life Among Taiwanese-Americans

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ABSTRACT

Taiwanese migrated to the United States first as graduate students in science fields in
the late 1960s and 1970s, and later also as investors and businessmen in the 1980’s
and 1990’s. Although within the United States they were classified within the broad
ethnic category “Chinese American”, among the migrants the sharp political and
cultural divide between native Taiwanese and Chinese “mainlanders” within Taiwan of
the early period was reproduced and in fact exaggerated overseas, where the
migrants could opt for separate social circles and language usage in private life.
Moreover, in the mid-1970’s Hokkien-speaking Taiwanese-Americans took up a
strident and relatively unified community position in support of Taiwan’s
democratization and independence that deeply affected their personal lives and their
relations with their homeland, given the Taiwan government’s overseas network of
spies and the blacklisting that denied them the right to return.

With the rising clout of the native Taiwanese middle class in Taiwan and then political
opening in the late 1980’s, tensions decreased, and the businessmen migrants
contributed to the growth of enclaves dubbed “Little Taipei” such as in Flushing, New
York and Monterey Park, California, where the native Taiwanese vs. mainlander
distinction waned. Despite this politicized context that at one time brought some
Taiwanese into contract with international revolutionary movements,
Taiwanese-Americans, as part of the secure American middle class and even the
military-industrial complex, have generally imbibed a very conservative and
pro-American political outlook. Likewise, their personal life perspectives tend to be
stable, conventional, and non-confrontational. This pattern continues in their second
generation, although here Taiwanese-American youth are increasingly subsumed
among the other descendants of the Chinese diaspora, as in their generation they
relate mainly to the dominantly white U.S. society.

Key words:
Taiwanese-American, Chinese-American, Taiwan, Little Taipei, brain drain, migration,
diaspora, democratization, Kuomintang (KMT), Democratic Progressive Party, blacklist, exile
politics, national liberation movement.
Introduction

This article is meant to be a loose social history of the Taiwanese-American community from the 1970's to the present. "Taiwanese" here is meant to specify "native Taiwanese", ethnically "Han" (ethnic Chinese) living in Taiwan for several generations (i.e. they originated from south China, speaking either Hokkien or Hakka dialects), in contrast to "mainlanders" who came to Taiwan after 1945 from various parts of China together with the government of Chiang Kai-shek [1]. This is an important distinction, but of course it has often been neglected and obscured, parallel to the Chiang regime's long insistence that Taiwan is only a small part of China, and that there was no internal discontent with its minority rule within Taiwan. For example, Iris Chang’s 2003 book The Chinese in America, devotes one chapter to “The Taiwanese-Americans”, but the description and cases she provides are all "mainlander" migrants from Taiwan, and there is surprisingly no mention of the Hokkien-speaking migrants and their community and political organizations. So I believe the social history to be presented here is a necessary correction to the English literature. But aside from describing the native Taiwanese Americans, I will occasionally mark some of the contrasts with the mainlanders from Taiwan who settled in the United States, and with Taiwanese who has migrated to Japan and elsewhere.

This account could be seen as an ethnographic commentary, composed largely of casual observation and anecdote, but hopefully still largely representative. It is written mostly from my own experience as part of the Taiwanese-American community, bonded first by marriage in 1969 and later from 1975 on by participation in the historic events of the Taiwan democratic movement. So I am describing in most detail the “brain drain” generation that migrated from Taiwan to the United States for graduate study in the period of the mid-1960's to late 1970's and their political activities of the 1980's. However, I will also discuss the businessman migrants of the 1980’s and 90’s, the “little study-abroad students” of the 90’s, and the second generation of the migrants. [2]

Initial Migration of Native Taiwanese: The Brain Drain, 1970's

When Taiwan was “restored” to the Republic of China in August 1945 following Japan’s surrender, fifty years after it had been occupied, most of the population was literate in Japanese; but this education was not recognized by the new rulers. After a decade the younger generation of native Taiwanese had substantially made the transition from Japanese to Mandarin Chinese, albeit with bitterness over the coercive suppression of their mother tongues by the Nationalist Chinese educational system. The children of mainlanders had some privileges and subsidies for schooling as the dependants of bureaucrats and military, but by the late 1960’s native Taiwanese were at least 70% of the student body in technical fields at the most prestigious university, National Taiwan University (i.e. a little less than the native Taiwanese proportion in the whole population, 85%). In political, diplomatic, and social disciplines the mainlanders clearly predominated, as seen especially at the second-ranked university, National Chengchi University, which was originally founded as a KMT cadres college and specialized in these fields.

From some meager population data, and also consistent with Iris Chang’s description, it is my impression that in the 1950's most migration from Taiwan to the United States was by mainlanders, whose families were still sunk in the refugee experience and mentality. Some with wealth stayed in Taiwan only briefly and then sought the safety of the United States or other countries as soon as possible, fearing the Chinese communists would eventually prevail. Others hedged their bureaucratic positions in Taiwan by sending their sons for study abroad, a route towards obtaining green card status.
By the 1960’s, however, the rapid expansion of technically-advanced military, aerospace and nuclear industries in the United States created the “brain drain” that swept tens of thousands of Taiwan youth to graduate school and thence secure employment in the United States.

The official numbers for study abroad, which had to be approved by the Ministry of Education until July 1989, are given as follows in five year increments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>USA &amp; Canada</th>
<th>Australia, NZ</th>
<th>UK, France, Germany</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Total in 5 yr period</th>
<th>Students Abroad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-54</td>
<td>1416</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1441</td>
<td>3637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-59</td>
<td>2645</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>2996</td>
<td>2553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-64</td>
<td>6719</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>1041</td>
<td>7977</td>
<td>4564</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965-69</td>
<td>11457</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>989</td>
<td>12834</td>
<td>6780</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970-74</td>
<td>9761</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>10550</td>
<td>12029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-79</td>
<td>18537</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>19938</td>
<td>12250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-84</td>
<td>26626</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>27852</td>
<td>17560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-89</td>
<td>35233</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>4762</td>
<td>4303</td>
<td>44362</td>
<td>22590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-94</td>
<td>69213</td>
<td>8186</td>
<td>18224</td>
<td>10253</td>
<td>105876</td>
<td>30960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-99</td>
<td>78137</td>
<td>14161</td>
<td>33233</td>
<td>8047</td>
<td>133578</td>
<td>36410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-04</td>
<td>79844</td>
<td>15450</td>
<td>46319</td>
<td>8087</td>
<td>149700</td>
<td>29234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: This table has been compiled from two tables, 1950-1989 and 1988-2004, on the ROC Ministry of Education website. There are numerous inconsistencies in the original tables. During 1989 the requirement for approval of study abroad by the Ministry of Education was deleted; and the sources of information change after this and the figures suddenly escalate. Appreciation to Dr. Jerome Keating for pointing me to this source.

Total for going abroad for study in the five-year period is just for the countries in prior columns, and does not include sizeable later numbers for Singapore (600-800 in 2004), Southeast Asia, or other European countries (875 in 2004), etc., or the small figures given for “Other” for the period 1950-89 (maximum 122).

Numbers of students abroad is taken from numbers on a chart on the Ministry of Education website, apparently those currently known to have student status. The data given is the first year in the five-year period. The peak is in the year 1994, at 37,580.

Note that after 1990 there are many fewer abroad at one time relative to total numbers going abroad for study in the period, implying that the majority are in short-term programs. Averaging the students abroad at the beginning and end of the period and dividing by the number of students who have gone abroad, we obtain the following indices:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Index 1950-54</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Index 1980-84</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-54</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>1980-84</td>
<td>0.72</td>
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<td>1.19</td>
<td>1985-89</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960-64</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>1990-94</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-69</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>1995-99</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-74</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>2000-04</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-79</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
By the end of 1974, nearly 32,000 students had gone to study in North America. Probably less than 10% returned to Taiwan after completion of study. One might suspect U.S. geo-political strategy in this cultivation of youth from Taiwan. The general impression is that 90% of the graduates of National Taiwan University in engineering fields went to the U.S., the vast majority with financial aid in the form of scholarships and research assistantships. Otherwise, U.S. tuition was prohibitive, and for the hard-working student from some country village, even the airplane ticket (say US$400) was a challenge barely met through pooling family and community resources. (In 1960’s Taiwan the monthly salary for an office worker was about US$25.) With their poor English language skills, Taiwanese students and their wives in the States often eeked out a living as waiters and workers in Chinese restaurants.

The peak of numbers going to Japan in 1960-69, I believe, reflects the preferences of Taiwanese who spoke some Japanese from pre-1945 schooling or through their parents; but the numbers of students with such linguistic background dropped within the following decade. Continuing the pattern of study established during the Japanese period, many studied medicine. Doctors were the few elite representatives of native Taiwan society during the Japanese colonial period, and likewise have been prominent in opposition to Kuomintang rule. Native Taiwanese students in Japan often came into contact with the Taiwan independence organizations that were established there in the 1950’s and 60’s. A fair number became political prisoners in the mid-1960’s after their return to Taiwan.

One such example is Dr. Chen Chung-tung of Yungho, Taipei County, who went to Japan to study medicine, joined Ku Kuan-min’s underground organization, and was arrested in 1965, newly married, the year after his return, for recruiting others to the Taiwan independence goals. Ironically, the name his father gave him in the Japanese period could be taken to mean “China united”. During his ten years imprisonment, he served as the clinic doctor at the Taiwan Garrison Command prison at Jingmei, south of Taipei, and was thus able to compile about four hundred names to add to the list of political prisoners that was smuggled out in 1971 and published abroad. [2]

There are a large number of Taiwanese in Japan, and also many Taiwanese-Japanese marriages, including Japanese marrying Taiwan indigenous women, especially Atayal and Truku. But rigid Japanese laws restricting residence rights and naturalization made it difficult for Taiwanese to achieve citizenship status in Japan. The Japanese government also tacitly allowed Taiwan dissidents to be kidnapped from Japan by the ROC security agencies. The Taiwanese community in Japan was very fearful of public activity, through to the 1980’s.

In the late 1960’s and 1970’s, America was the land of opportunity. Once the student had completed his degree in the United States, his prospects were good. Citizenship was a prerequisite for the military-industrial complex, but somehow this was usually expedited. In fact some American blacks grumbled that they had struggled for affirmative action, only to see choice technical jobs go to recently-arrived Asians – predominantly from Taiwan, because at that time there was little migration from Korea and none from mainland China –, Asians who had no identification with American minorities, and no critical sense of the role of the military-industrial structures they worked for. The native Taiwanese may have had a slight advantage over mainlanders from Taiwan in this: security clearance was easier for those who had no relatives living under communist control. However, poor English and limited integration into American culture kept these technical specialists below positions of management and authority. This association with the American military-industrial complex has perhaps accentuated the conservative tendencies of the Taiwanese-American community, though the diversity of professional employment seems to have gradually expanded, to medical research and practice, aerospace and aviation (e.g. Boeing), non-military engineering (e.g. electricity utilities), professorships, etc.
The few native Taiwanese who came to the United States in this early period to seek advanced degrees in sociology and political science were for the most part unable to find employment in their field, not surprising because of limited English proficiency, and were forced to find practical business opportunities. Two examples of this are found in a recent book of interviews with Taiwanese-American community leaders in the New York area. [3] Both Lee Cheng-san and Patrick Huang (Huang Dzai-tien), long active in Taiwanese community organizations in the New York area, began sociology studies in 1968 and 1974 respectively, but they have had to make their living through restaurant and real estate businesses. Rather, Patrick’s family with two sons for many years depended on wife Sharon’s salary as an accountant, while he devoted himself to Taiwan independence activities.

Those who went to the United States to study political science, international relations, or sociology on Taiwan government scholarship were predominantly mainlanders, but did include a few Taiwanese in cooperation with the ruling KMT, such as Parris Chang (Chang Hsu-cheng), who went to study at the University of Washington in Seattle in the mid-1960’s and later became chair of the Political Science Department at University of Pennsylvania, College Park. But such Taiwanese have still been able to make the transition to Taiwan identity politics; in 1993 Dr. Chang was appointed a Democratic Progressive Party National Legislator. Many mainlanders in social sciences got their Ph.D.’s at conservative Southern or religious institutions, such as St. John’s in Queens, New York; and if they did not return to government or KMT party service in Taiwan, they often became professors at like institutions, where they represented the KMT version of Chinese and Taiwan history in academic debates.

As for lifestyle, the technocratic and academic salarymen generally lived in the standard middle-class suburbs or in college towns, in large, minimally-furnished tract houses, to make the most of income tax deductions and rising property values. Some were exposed to black neighborhoods if their universities were in the inner city, as at University of Chicago, but for the most part Taiwanese-Americans avoided racial issues and particularly black neighborhoods, to protect their investment, while they became deeply engrossed in their own Taiwanese-American activities.

Wives generally also had come originally as students, even though they likely met their husbands in Taiwan before graduate study. Some, like Lee Cheng-san, were married in the relatively traditional context of 1960’s Taiwan, and left their wives and children for a few years with the extended family of their parents, before they brought their wives to the United States. Either way, wives rarely had the luxury of devoting themselves to study or childcare; their quick contribution to family finances was imperative, because the husband’s career took precedence. In middle age, some wives complained that they had given up their studies at the master’s level, to support the husband’s Ph.D. studies, and were left with boring medical technician and library jobs for the next twenty years. In the early period, however, aside from marrying a classmate or a classmate’s sister, a student on the way to a Ph.D. could come back to Taiwan for a brief trip after years of forlorn student bachelorhood, and quickly get a wife through introduction by family and matchmakers, due to the prestige and bright prospects of studying abroad.

Such was the background of the Chung Chao-man case, in 1969 or 1970. Let me indulge here in relating one sensational case. Short, dark, and taciturn, and in the last year of Ph.D. studies at University of California, San Diego, Chung was smitten with a pretty, petite, vivacious Hakka girl surnamed Tang, whose parents reportedly persuaded her to marry him. Her father was an ROC representative to Mexico, in nearby Tijuana. But Tang became involved with a quirky grad student, also Taiwanese, and a few months later demanded a divorce from her husband. Perhaps his upcoming thesis orals added to his exasperation. After an all-night argument overheard by Taiwanese neighbors in the student apartments, there was abrupt silence. Two days later, San Diego police came to the campus to ask assistance from other Taiwanese students in explaining a cryptic telegram from Taiwan. In a week, the
whole story emerged. Chung Chao-man had killed his wife with a kitchen cleaver, wrapped her body in a sleeping bag that he put in the back of his car, and flew back to Taiwan, where he gave himself up to police. In Taiwan there was public sympathy for Chung, wronged by his wife’s adultery. But Annette Lu (Lu Hsiu-lien), founder of Taiwan’s early women’s movement and now Vice President of Taiwan, in 1970 wrote newspaper articles to challenge the husband’s presumed right to avenge his honor. [4] Chung was sentenced to seven years. After his release he was still able to take up a professional career in Taiwan.

But such a tale of adultery was quite exceptional for the Taiwanese migrants. Rather, to my impression they tended to staid, conventional relationships in marriage, extremely stable, and even more so than among their age mates back in Taiwan. That is, whereas the Taiwanese-Americans tended to reside somewhat isolated in college towns and simple professional communities, back home businessmen were often feted at girlie bars, the society tacitly condoned men maintaining second wives, and there were more environments where potential partners speaking the same language could be found.

Other Routes of Migration in the 1960’s and 1970’s

Also, during the period when there were thousands of U.S. troops and officers in Taiwan, especially in support of the war in Vietnam, about mid-1960’s to early 1970’s, a fair number of enlisted men and NCO’s married Taiwanese women, often less educated women whom they might have met in bars, tourist shops and dance halls around Lin Shen North Road. For one such couple I knew in Taiwan in about 1967, their five-year-old son provided translation for communication between them. To my knowledge, if the women went to the States with their husbands, the marriages were basically stable (because the women were long-suffering and fatalistic, as well as devoted to their children), and the women became accustomed to American life, despite loneliness in their huge tract homes. Also, once the wife had achieved U.S. citizenship after three years of residence, it was relatively easy in those days for her siblings and parents to obtain visas and then green cards, and so her migration was a boon for her family members, who might apply their Taiwanese spirit of enterprise and hard work to restaurants or dry-cleaning shops. But twenty years later, after seeing the advance of prosperity in Taiwan and the accumulation of houses by working class people who were able to take the initiative in their own society and saved hard and bought houses, while they migrated, some women who married GI’s or spent time as laborers in South America regretted that decision. That is, they regretted moving to a foreign land where they could only be marginal or dependant. The men they married only rarely learned any Chinese, and there were unlikely to be other Taiwanese near the mid-Western hometowns of U.S. military men. They had to assimilate to American society on its own terms.

The apparent alienation of such women migrants from their own culture can perhaps be shown in one example that now has an interesting denouement in the next generation. Tony Coolidge is an American who only in his late twenties began to try to trace his Asian ancestry. He did not know until after his mother’s untimely death that his heritage was an indigenous tribe of northern Taiwan, the Atayal in Wulai, a mountainous hot springs area south of Taipei that has long been a center of tourism. He found that his mother was one of three daughters who married American military men, following on an aunt who married to the U.S. in 1962. The family ran a tourist hotel. Tony was born in 1967; his teenage mother was deserted by a GI who was transferred back to the States. Two years later, she married an American intelligence officer, bore another son and a daughter, and followed her husband to assignments in Germany and Korea. Tony painfully saw her loneliness; some twenty years later, divorced, she was able to join her sisters in Florida, but she never returned to Taiwan. Tony married a Taiwanese woman he met in the university, and in 1995 he sought out his relatives in Taiwan. Deeply impressed by the warmth of his Atayal uncles and cousins, he set up an organization and a website, www.atayal.com, and in October 2004 put together a festival of indigenous cultures, native American and Taiwanese, in Orlando, Florida. [5]
Some low-income, limited-education native Taiwanese were able to leave Taiwan in the way of migration to Brazil, Central America, and some other Latin American countries, as did Japanese, in the 1970’s. Some mainlanders, fearful Taiwan would soon capitulate to the communists, went to South America or even Africa soon after 1950, for lack of a better destination. Many of these migrants, or their children, re-migrated later to the United States; hence there are some young Taiwanese-Americans and Chinese-Americans with Hispanic names and fluency in Spanish or Portuguese, or even more exotic languages.

The Rise of Formosan Nationalism: Taiwanese-American Community Organizations

By the late 1960’s, the number of native Taiwanese students in the United States began to reach a critical mass, at least enough to lead to small eruptions of dissent. Kansas State University at Manhattan, Kansas, was the site of one successful struggle, one from which many of the participants went on to become the founding force of the United Formosans for Independence.

This struggle was recently recounted by N.H. Wang (Wang Neng-hsiang) on August 2, 2005, in an interview at the National History Institute in Hsintien, south of Taipei. N.H.’s story is illustrative of the dedication of hundreds of Taiwanese youth abroad at this time. [6]

“N.H.”, born in 1933 in Nandze District of Kaohsiung City, became an abandoned child wandering the countryside for three years after his father, who fled China in 1912 (defeated Manchu supporters) and was registered as "Chinese", was interred by the Japanese authorities during World War II. N.H. witnessed executions in Kaohsiung during 2-2-8. Despite the gaps in his education and inability to speak Mandarin Chinese, he was able to graduate from National Taiwan University in political science in 1959. His knack for taking tests brought him good positions in the post office and the customs service, but his experience as a native Taiwanese in the mainland-dominated bureaucracy left him with deep resentment of the KMT’s discrimination and political control. He went to the United States in Fall 1965, choosing Kansas State because it provided full scholarship and support.

N.H. arrived just in time to take up the task of demanding university recognition for the Formosan Student Association; the administration would provide subsidies for only one foreign student group from each country. After a formal hearing by the administration, the Chinese Student Association was displaced in favor of the Formosans, a cause for great celebration. In Winter 1966, N.H. participated in the founding meeting of the United Formosans for Independence, in Philadelphia. The Taiwan authorities retaliated by revoking N.H.’s passport, and two years after arriving he was stateless and blacklisted, and unable to bring his wife from Taiwan, resulting in divorce some years later.

N.H.’s childhood history here as “Chinese” is unusual; more common for the early migrants is an impoverished childhood in the countryside, especially given conditions of wartime and early ROC rule. E.g., Patrick Huang’s right arm is underdeveloped and minimally usable because he fell out of a tree as a child, and his family had no money for medical treatment. Lee Cheng-san’s family was left destitute after his father, a member of farmers’ rights movements in the Japanese period, was involved in armed resistance during 2-2-8 and hid for seven years.

In 1969 another student activist, Cary Hong (Hong Dze-sheng), and friends drove around the United States to visit campuses and collect the name lists of Chinese student associations and related groups. N.H. made up name lists of Taiwanese everywhere he went by telephoning all the Chinese names in the phone book and selecting those who answered with a Taiwanese accent. N.H. was editor of three publications that were mailed out: Wang Chun
Fong (Hoping for the Spring Breeze) and Taiwan Ren-chuan Wen-hua (Taiwan Human Rights Culture), handwritten in Chinese characters, and Independent Taiwan in typewritten English. In the next few years N.H. went on to orchestrate a campaign for writing letters to the editor to challenge China Lobby control of American public opinion, and in 1972 he moved to Washington D.C. to concentrate on lobbying the U.S. Congress. N.H. made his living as a certified public accountant.

It is difficult to gauge the impact of this early footwork. There was a deep pall of fear; reportedly, Taiwanese students would not dare to borrow from the library George Kerr’s account of the 1947 massacres, Formosa Betrayed, finally published in 1966, for fear that the circulation list could be obtained by spies, and they would turn the pages with chopsticks so as not to leave fingerprints. Every campus had “professional students” who made monthly reports, and who could exaggerate reports out of spite or to claim achievement in gathering intelligence.

But to external impressions, in the early years there was very little politicization among the community of students who could speak Mandarin Chinese, more or less: these included students from Hong Kong and Malaysia as well as Taiwan, both native Taiwanese and mainlander. They picnicked and celebrated Chinese New Years and the Moon Festival with potluck dinners; all had meager budgets, and a few had small children. But this easy community changed precipitously in 1970.

In January 1970 the famous professor of international law Peng Ming-min, under house arrest in Taiwan after his 1966 attempt to distribute a pamphlet demanding Taiwan self-determination, suddenly surfaced in Sweden. In April a Cornell student in sociology, Peter Huang (Huang Wen-hsiung), attempted to assassinate Chiang Ching-kuo, heir apparent, in New York City.

Then in 1970 and 1971 students in Taiwan and overseas mobilized to protest the U.S. return of some small rocky islets northeast of Taiwan (Diaoyutai, “fishing platforms”, in Chinese or Senkaku Islands in Japanese) to Japan together with Okinawa. Ostensibly at first called in support of ROC claims, the demonstrations overseas turned into a movement against the Chiang Kai-shek regime, and in favor of the Peoples Republic of China. Especially the sons and daughters of KMT bureaucrats seemed to turn into instant Red Guards; their shrillness no doubt reflected all the torturous contradictions of KMT propaganda, as well as confrontations with parents frozen in the trauma of the Chinese civil war. Later the Diaoyutai Movement was said to be taking instructions from Huang Hua, the PRC ambassador to Canada.

Nixon was also courting rapprochement with China. The Cantonese-Americans went wild with excitement: for a hundred years they had sired the next generation with returns to their native villages, but they had been cut off from their Chinese heritage by anti-communist paranoia since 1949. The PRC’s 1971 accession to the China seat in the United Nations, long overdue, sealed the delegitimization of the Republic of China regime on Taiwan. At this point the reaction of the students from Taiwan split abruptly between native Taiwanese and mainlanders, with mainlanders insisting Taiwan was part of China, and native Taiwanese quietly demurring.

Most importantly, the formation of Taiwan identity that was embryonic in the 1960’s began a life of its own in 1970-71. The Taiwan independence movement, which until that time had been mostly centered in Japan, was reorganized in 1971 under U.S.-based leadership as the World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI, colloquially referred to in English as “woofy”, and in Chinese as “du meng”); this united groups in Japan, Europe, the U.S., Canada, and Brazil, whose membership was kept secret except for a few public figures.

In 1970-71, Taiwanese-American associations (Taiwan Compatriot Associations, or “tong
hsiang huei") began springing up all over the United States. Though they put on a non-political front at first, merely forming communities of Hokkien-speakers for social activities and mutual assistance, the opposition to KMT-forced assimilation to Mandarin Chinese was implicit, and they soon became reservoirs for assistance to the native Taiwanese opposition in Taiwan. WUFI sought out and secretly inducted the most active members of the community organizations, and fought off attempts by the KMT to infiltrate and water down their programs.

A world-wide association of Taiwanese clubs was formed in 1973, and it held annual conferences where inevitably the future of Taiwan was discussed, and exiled political figures were asked to address the central sessions. In addition to the world conference held at various locations, four or five regional conferences throughout the U.S. would be held over the Fourth of July weekend, renting U.S. campus facilities, combining adult political and cultural activities with family recreation, usually with about 300-500 families attending each. The congregations of Christian churches which spoke Hokkien, usually Presbyterian as an extension of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, played an even more militant role of promoting Taiwanese identity and independence.

The ROC and its consulates responded by forming their own Taiwan Friendship Associations, speaking Mandarin, and featuring subsidized recreation and entertainment with no political content, or merely cultural expression of the motifs of Chinese nationalism, i.e. supporting tours of Peking opera and dance, and sending summertime teachers to the Chinese language weekend schools. More sinister were the networks of “professional students” on every campus, usually with government scholarship, that were paid to make reports on their fellow students, intimidate the few students who dared to be critical of the regime, and stop the spread of unfavorable information and activities. I was once told in the late 1980’s that the KMT spy network even extended into professional life: that there were informants among employees at IBM in New York State. The KMT networks operated nearly openly with the apparent tacit consent of American security agencies such as the FBI, despite U.S. laws against acting as the agent of a foreign government.

The consequences of being identified as opposition could be serious: loss of ROC passport, blacklisting for re-entry to Taiwan and jobs in government institutions (especially damaging for those with high education), harassment of relatives in Taiwan, and even arrest on return to Taiwan. In one early notable case, a graduate student at University of Hawaii, Chen Yu-hsi, was kidnapped from Japan in 1968 because of his involvement in anti-Vietnam War activities, and sentenced to seven years; under international pressure he served only four years and was allowed to return to Hawaii in 1975. Dr. Chen Wen-chen, a professor at Carnegie Mellon University, who was also secretly a member of Taiwan Era, a leftist Taiwan independence organization, was found murdered the day after he was taken in for questioning by the Taiwan Garrison Command, during a trip back to Taiwan in July 1981. Rita Yeh (Yeh Dao-lei), a young mainlander studying sociology at the University of Minnesota, was arrested after return to Taiwan and sentenced to fourteen years in January 1981 based partly on her activities in the U.S., 1974-77. [10] Rita Yeh was released after seven years, but has not appeared to talk about her experience. All of these cases depended on intelligence gathered in the United States.

Despite the overall political conservatism of the Taiwanese-American community, the ideals of the 1960's civil rights, social justice, and anti-war movements in the United States and Europe did resound with many Taiwanese, especially those from impoverished rural backgrounds; it may be hard it envision now, but a select few Taiwanese were involved in organizing Mexican tomato-pickers in the mid-West, hung out with the Students for a Democratic Society, or traveled to Nicaragua to observe the revolutionary social milieu there. Even the conservative World United Formosans for Independence flaunted liberal leftists like Cary Hong, as if to take on a radical cachet that proved they were serious revolutionaries like the South Africans or the Palestinians.
For comparison, the Taiwanese students in Europe also took up some of the political tone of the countries they resided in, to my experience. Their fields of study were also different from those who went to the States: Taiwan students studied art in Paris, music in Vienna, and law and social welfare in Germany. The detailed statistics of the Ministry of Education show that numbers of students went to France earlier than to Germany. Taiwanese students in Germany and Sweden formed at least a few disciplined, closely coordinated Marxist organizations. Those in France spoke with revolutionary romanticism, in grandiose Maoist jargon, while lounging in smoke-filled cafes. The European cadres of World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) were sharply critical of the pro-Americanism of the U.S. organization; but they were far in the minority in the whole membership, in which the Taiwanese-Americans with natural science backgrounds predominated.

An outcome of a working class background among migrants to Latin America was that the Taiwanese in Brazil were among the most militant in opposition to the KMT and more ready to use violent means; Su Bing’s (Shih Ming, based in Tokyo) leftist Taiwan independence underground network, which carried out sabotage bombings on KMT facilities such as the Central News Agency in Taipei, had active cells there in the 1970’s and 80’s.

The Kaohsiung Incident, 1979: Concern for Homeland Leads Taiwanese towards the American Political Process

The Taiwan democratic movement of 1978-79, culminating in the Formosa Magazine organization and the Kaohsiung Incident, December 10, 1979, and the subsequent trials, galvanized the overseas native Taiwanese of all stripes.

A community and church telephone news service founded in 1978 by Eileen Chang (Chang Yang Yi-yi) of Jamaica, N.Y., “Voice of Taiwan”, quickly became a beacon for quick communications. The Voice of Taiwan originally just provided a recorded telephone message about upcoming community events to the caller. But in November 1978, Eileen thought to call up the number in Taiwan given for the newly-formed Non-KMT Candidates Campaign Coalition – my home number, since my husband at the time, former political prisoner Shih Ming-teh, was the General Secretary. With the relative immunity of a white American, I relayed the news of the rapid coalescence of the opposition forces, despite tapped phones. Eileen compiled that with other smuggled information sources and analyses to record a daily news report. Voice of Taiwan spread across the Taiwanese-American communities, because anyone could dedicate a telephone line and an answering machine to the task, and in 1980 it had some thirty lines, with some reporting in Mandarin and Hakka and English, as well as in Hokkien. The network printed up cards with all the lines listed, so that any visitor from Taiwan could get the news that was censored in Taiwan as immediately as possible, and could also link up with Taiwanese-American community groups wherever they were, to follow the tumultuous events in Taiwan.

The overseas organizations that had emerged in 1978-79 to report on and support the democratic movement in Taiwan reached a critical mass as they responded to the crackdown subsequent on the Kaohsiung Incident. In these dozen months, especially with the breakthrough of the “dangwai” opposition movement to public action, the overseas supporters had formed multiple links with the opposition figures in Taiwan, adding political participation to their occasional trips home to see aging parents or develop business opportunities. They knew personally many of those on trial in March and April 1980, e.g. through activities organized by the community groups and churches. Lawyer Yao Chia-wen, for example, had been in the United States in 1975 for several months on an Asia Foundation grant to study legal aid programs.
Taiwanese-Americans began a flurry of activities that must have been foreign to them at first—calling the media, contacting their Congressmen, making presentations to American church and civic groups on the situation in Taiwan. The Taiwanese Association for Human Rights, founded first in New York by Tina Chang, the wife of George Chang (Chang Tsan-hong, a mild-mannered professor of chemical engineering and long-time chairman of WUFI, dedicated to the violent overthrow of the KMT) was at that time being run out of Leucadia, California (north of San Diego) by Fan Ching-liang and others of the Taiwanese community. In Seattle, grad students at the University of Washington, Chen Fang-min, and Gerrit van der Wees (from Holland) and his Taiwanese wife Chen Mei-chin, took over in 1980 and expanded the newsletter Taiwan Communique, continuing from newsletters put out the previous year by Lynn Miles from Osaka, Japan. [11] These and other channels of smuggled information fed into the newsletters and Voice of Taiwan reports, which were quickly relayed through the Taiwanese communities in large cities and in college towns.

Taiwanese who had already gotten U.S. citizenship and were established in their professions were less afraid of repercussions from Taiwan; but they still faced blacklisting and harassment of their relatives. They were often reluctant to have their names listed or appear as spokesmen, but still hundreds appeared at demonstrations in main U.S. cities, picketing the ROC official offices. Following the Formosa Magazine leadership arrests, three ROC offices in the U.S. and one in Germany were ransacked by Taiwanese in masks or face paint. Dr. Kuo Ching-jiang of Fountain Valley was investigated by the FBI on suspicion of being the ringleader in Southern California, but it was unable to collect sufficient evidence—a sign of community solidarity. In Germany, the culprits, all in face paint, included a Taiwanese Presbyterian minister and his German wife, who told me proudly of their role. These relatively symbolic expressions of anger were not the only response of the Taiwanese communities to the arrests, torture, and even murder—on February 28, 1980, the twin daughters and mother of jailed Formosa Magazine leader Lin Yi-hsiung were stabbed to death—perpetrated under the ROC authorities. Three or four bombs were set off against KMT targets in the Los Angeles area, and one at the home of the son of the intelligence chief Wang Sheng killed the son’s father-in-law. California listed Taiwanese as one of four nationalities to be watched for terror activities in the state.

This kind of activity was difficult for the sedate and law-abiding Taiwanese-Americans to stomach; but they had long been deeply involved in fervent hopes for democracy and self-determination for their homeland. Hsu Hsin-liang, a militant founder of the democratic movement in Taiwan, elected Commissioner of Taoyuan County in November 1977 and removed mid-term by the KMT in July 1979, was abroad at the time of the crackdown. A few days after the arrests in Taiwan, he had joined with WUFI and Japan-based Taiwan independence organizations to pledge to “wipe the KMT from the face of the earth.” In June 1980 the alliance with WUFI split at the seams (another incident in a pattern of the self-styled Taiwanese-American revolutionaries declining leadership from figures of democratic struggle exiled from Taiwan), and Hsu Hsin-liang formed a publication Formosa Weekly (twenty-four pages small format on newsprint) with a staff secreted in a safe house in Latino east Los Angeles, to carry on with the message and distribute smuggled news hot from Taiwan. Not to be outdone, WUFI headquartered in New York and New Jersey put together its own mouthpiece newspaper, Taiwan Tribune. Although both were dedicated to issues of protest in Taiwan and printed in characters for the first generation migrants, some second generation sections gradually began to creep in, such as church materials in Romanized Hokkien language, and short articles in English explaining the political situation in Taiwan. The rivalry between the two organizations for Taiwanese-American support in readership and finances was in some ways destructive, but it also stimulated political and social initiatives over the following years.

This period was a watershed for the Taiwanese migrants and students abroad, where they often got more complete information than was generally available within Taiwan. Many
determined to return to Taiwan and take on the struggle. But overall, petitioning Congressmen and Senators and making appeals to the American public brought them more into the realm of American society, at least the middle-upper class sectors of it.

Emergence of Open Political Organizations among North American Taiwanese-Americans, 1980’s On

The trend towards participation in American society, as well as increasing openness in defiance of the KMT, resulted in the formation of several organizations that have become increasingly institutionalized in Taiwanese-American social life.

First, in late 1980 Dr. Trong Chai (Tsai Tong-rong, a professor of political science at New York University and a former chairman of WUFI) began setting up a network to focus on lobbying Congress for the Taiwanese cause, the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA, synonymous with "strike a blow!" in Hokkien). WUFI was not entirely pleased about this; though ostensibly a revolutionary organization, WUFI actually solicited funds and expended them largely in public relations and lobbying. (For example, WUFI arranged for former Attorney General Ramsey Clark to attend the Kaohsiung Incident trials in early 1980, at a cost of at least US$10,000. The government postponed the trial date, so Clark’s arrival in Taiwan did not give him access to the court scene, but it no doubt added to international pressure for an open trial.) In bringing the lobbying effort out into the open, FAPA also stole WUFI’s thunder. However, this organizational structure for lobbying, with an office in a row house in southeast Washington D.C. that was bought by Taiwanese hotel owners, became firmly embedded within a few years of its official establishment in 1982. FAPA chapters were set up throughout the Taiwanese-American communities, and later even in Taiwan. Dr. Coen Blaauw, a Dutch Ph.D. who wrote his international affairs thesis on Taiwan’s attempt to buy submarines, thought he was only coming to Washington for a brief internship. He is still there.

At first FAPA only reflected the narrow concerns of the first generation Taiwanese migrants for democratization of their homeland. However, it soon began to offer internships for congressional work to second-generation Taiwanese-Americans, some of whom aspired to be lawyers and politicians, rather than engineers and doctors like their parents, and here it began to take on the concerns of U.S. citizens. One FAPA campaign was for a new designation in the U.S. census, to list Taiwan as well as China for place of ethnic origin. In Washington FAPA also came into contact and even a little cooperation with human rights efforts for other countries, especially Tibet. [12] Coen Blaauw was one of the promoters of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), and so Taiwan was listed as a founding member, along with the Baltic states. UNPO, headquartered in The Hague, managed to stay in close association with the United Nations and grow in strength to about forty nations represented, but was not able to help Taiwan get around the “one China principle”. But despite contact with a wider range of countries, FAPA was far from progressive. It was single-mindedly pro-American, and in fact increasingly conservative in its alliance with U.S. politicians. Its ideal was the Jewish-American Citizens’ League. (A namesake, Taiwanese-American Citizens’ League, was formed in the mid-1980’s to serve the Taiwanese community in Los Angeles, including immigration issues.)

Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, as well as Donald Fraser from Minnesota, noted liberal Democrats, had been strong supporters of Taiwan human rights in 1980 when the dangwai was under attack. Taiwanese in Los Angeles held a significant fundraiser for Kennedy in August 1980. Senator Jesse Helms and the 1980 presidential candidate Ronald
Reagan, conservative Republicans, clearly aligned with the KMT; Ronald Reagan’s law office Deaver and Hannaford was in fact on US$5,000 a month retainer from the ROC, along with the Guatemalan generals (reported by the Washington Post in November 1980). However, individual Republican congressman such as Richard Lugar and Tony Hall did go on record for Taiwan human rights. As the tight community organization and substantial funds of Taiwanese-Americans became apparent to U.S. politicians, a number began to court that constituency, in particular Stephen Solarz, and later Robert Torricelli, less-than-progressive Democrats, who frequently represented Taiwanese issues and positions in Congressional resolutions. The implications of their Cuba-bashing did not register with Taiwanese-Americans.

In the 1980’s, following the tragedy and exhilaration of the events of 1979 and 1980, including the Kaohsiung Incident trials that put the legitimacy of the Chiang regime and its dubious laws into the international spotlight, organization in the Taiwanese-American community advanced rapidly. A lasting organization formed in the wake of the Kaohsiung Incident trials was the North American Taiwanese Professors’ Association (NATPA, established in 1980 under the leadership of Professor Liao Shu-chung), at first centered around doctors and academics in Chicago. [13] NATPA provided an image of respectability to the Taiwanese cause, which the KMT tried to portray as the realm of scruffy and uneducated discontents.

Chicago, a stronghold of WUFI and also of the doctors who initiated NATPA, was probably the first city to set up a Taiwanese community center, I think in 1981, headed by a Presbyterian minister. They bought an old building, and marginally fixed it up to provide some simple work program for extra income for elders, and recreation space for teenagers. The project did not make it past two years; the stigma of Taiwanese culture as dangerous opposition to the regime probably dampened the broader participation it needed to float financially. Similarly, a community center set up by a progressive Presbyterian minister halfway down the Peninsula in the San Francisco Bay Area only lasted a year or so. But a community hall purchased and remodeled thoroughly in Flushing, New York, managed to survive recurrent financial crises [5], and it has served as a locus for all kinds of Hokkien-speaking activities, including speeches by visiting Taiwan opposition politicians to audiences of 500, and shows of traditional puppetry. Los Angeles, with a very large Taiwanese population, was able to set up a retirement home just for older Taiwanese in the early 1980’s.

The establishment of the Taiwanese-American community centers reinforced the sense of Taiwanese identity. Whereas the official government representative office after the cessation of formal USA-ROC diplomatic relations bore the confusing name “North American Coordinating Council” with no geographical reference, the Taiwan Centers were unambiguously listed in the phone book. They continually received calls from persons seeking visas to Taiwan, and had to redirect the inquiries.

Somewhat later the North American Taiwanese-American Women’s Association (NATWA) was formed, beginning in 1988 in California, spurred on by Lu Hsiu-lien after she was released from jail in 1985 and allowed to go to the States. NATWA encouraged first generation Taiwanese-American women, now leisured with the children grown up, to participate more in the standard American institutions, such as in volunteer work for local hospitals; it did not model itself on American women’s organizations that promoted feminist consciousness or gender politics. I still remember Chang Fu-mei, the first head of the organization and herself a professor at Hoover Institution, demurely beginning her address with thanks to her husband for letting her participate.

Mainlander/Native Taiwanese Variations in Assimilation to American Culture

By the mid-1970’s, some larger community groups held Saturday schools to teach their children Mandarin Chinese, which was also encouraged and assisted by the ROC
Commission of Overseas Chinese. However, many of the early native Taiwanese migrants had a strong aversion to Mandarin Chinese. They would speak only Hokkien with their children; their second generation, now in their twenties and thirties, often speaks colloquial Hokkien fluently, but no Mandarin, and very few can read Chinese characters.

The early native Taiwanese migrants more generally approved of their children's Americanization. Although this implies sexual liberalization and disregard for elders that might not be palatable to most Taiwanese, almost all the Taiwanese-American mothers that I have asked say that their teenagers are well behaved, and do not indulge in sexual or drug experimentation. That is not to say that there have not been a few cases of problems with young white American daughters-in-law, viewed as indolent and irresponsible.

In contrast to acceptance of Americanization among native Taiwanese immigrants, the mainlanders from Taiwan, at least the few I have known well, are more adamant in insisting on the superiority of Chinese civilization and in resisting the vulgarity and casualness of modern American style. In their hearts China is still the central kingdom, and parents must be obeyed absolutely as in the Confucian tradition. A decade ago I observed a mainland mother in New Jersey vehemently chastise her five-year-old daughter, in Mandarin, as soon as the other mother left, for running around the house wildly with the five-year-old son of the visitor. I was stunned that the mother felt this play was licentious; the little girl seemed traumatized back to proper decorous behavior. In later years she seemed subdued, almost sullen towards her mother, and perhaps despondent.


The social and political structure of Taiwan began to be transformed in the 1970's as the export economy expanded the native Taiwanese segment of the economy, and Chiang Ching-kuo realigned national priorities to emphasize the development of Taiwan. In 1976 it finally became permissible to leave the country under the stated purpose of tourism, although the security agencies still kept tight surveillance of exit and entry, and their approval was required for issuance of passports and re-entry permits, which were sensitive issues especially given the prevailing sentiments for Taiwanese independence abroad.

This migration from Taiwan to the United States also reflected the push for escape, or preparation of an escape route, from Taiwan following the U.S. de-recognition of the Republic of China, announced in December 1978. Fear of attack by the Peoples Republic of China was elevated for some time. Well-to-do people could invent business trips and U.S. subsidiaries.

There is some slight evidence that the Taiwan security agencies, stung in 1979-80 due to strong overseas support for Taiwan dissidents, also soon after sent numbers abroad with appropriate covers, to try to up surveillance overseas. Over the long run, this also provided an escape their own personnel, concerned that if the native Taiwanese took over in Taiwan, they could be called to account.

The tourist loophole opened the floodgates for Taiwanese businessmen to travel to the United States and buy up homes in the San Francisco Bay Area; Queens and Jamaica, New York; and the western suburbs of Los Angeles, driving up property prices as they paid cash on the line. Although they came on non-immigrant visas to visit relatives, or under E-1 and E-2 categories for business dealings, it was relatively easy at that time to convert to an immigrant visa. Before U.S. recognition of China, Taiwan was allocated the whole quota for immigration from China. Moreover, it was not until 1997 that overstaying a non-immigrant visa began to be penalized with prejudice against subsequent approval for immigration. The conditions for verifying business interests involved investment of US$1 million, which after five years would
provide a conditional green card (permanent residence card); after another two years, an unconditional green card. The holders of green cards were supposed to actually reside in the United States for most of the year, or forfeit the card; but actually they were able to maintain their status by residing in the States for just a few weeks a year, during which time they would report to the Immigration and Naturalization Service authorities. [14]

As well known to Taiwanese immigration advisors, the commercial migrants faked a large portion of their documentation for proving they were eminent businessmen investing in the United States. However, we might also assume that the tough INS officials of the United States, used to grilling immigrant applicants on their personal lives, kept tabs on the situation, and saw that Taiwanese immigration led to economic development and no social problems.

Within a year or so after 1982, the New Taiwan Dollar appreciated steeply, from US$1 = NT$40 to US$1 = NT$25, an appreciation of 60%. Taiwanese bought and operated motels in Los Angeles and Washington D.C., among other real estate investments. The “Taipei Towns” expanded rapidly to provide a full range of Taiwanese home style comforts to the migrants, both the professionals and the businessmen: restaurants, markets, movies, bookstores, traditional Chinese medicine. This provided a whole range of opportunities for immigrants who hardly spoke English, reproducing the middle-class preferences and customs of Taiwanese.

(The same pattern applied to the Koreans as well; a large Koreatown has appeared on the west side of Los Angeles, around Normandie. In New York, the Koreans specialized as green grocers, taking up the earlier role of Italians in densely-packed neighborhoods, and running excellent salad bars in Manhattan. However, the Koreans have not had a large graduate student population graduating into secure professional employment as have the Taiwanese, and likewise their overseas support for their home democratic movement in the 1980’s could not compare.)

There have been a few failed students or businessmen who have sunk to American working class, but those who did not make professional status in the technical field of their Ph.D. have often made more money over the long run through specializing in consumer and industrial imports from Taiwan such as sports attire or acrylic and Lucite sheets. Or at the least they have been able to pool funds from relatives and classmates, and become slumlords in the outlying areas of New York City: Flushing, Queens, or Jamaica.

The Projection of Taiwanese-American Political Concern to Taiwan in the 1980’s

As the dangwai candidates, largely first the wives of those arrested following the Kaohsiung Incident, made their mark in elections in Taiwan from 1980 on and forced the ruling party under Chiang Ching-kuo to take note of the temper of the native Taiwanese majority (although of course their victories still did not change the polity much because only a small fraction of the membership of the rubber stamp national bodies was ever up for election), the pace of “Taiwanization” quickened. A related element was the gradual loosening of KMT ideological rigidity and martial law repression. Whereas it had seemed up to 1984 that Gen. Wang Sheng, a mainlander hardliner, was heir apparent to Chiang Ching-kuo, the October 1984 murder of Henry Liu (Chiang Nan; author of a critical biography of Chiang) in Daly City, California, set off a quiet State Department backlash that probably led to Chiang appointing Lee Teng-hui, a native Taiwanese technocrat of agricultural economics, as his Vice President. I believe that that backlash also led to a substantial dismantlement of the KMT intelligence network in the U.S. Fear of association with native Taiwanese-oriented activities in America subsided somewhat.

In 1984 twenty-seven young and progressive members of WUFI broke off under the leadership of Cary Hong and Patrick Huang in New York City, and declared the establishment of the Taiwan Revolutionary Party. They challenged WUFI leaders to an open debate at the
July 1984 summer camp held at the University of Pennsylvania – WUFI leaders responded by limiting discussion to future political program and forbidding mention of past disputes. Although the content of the challenge, also fueled indirectly by the old Taiwanese communist Shih Ming in Japan, was closer to the ideology of national liberation movements around the world, the effect was rather to incorporate more open community participation than was the habit under the tightly-held WUFI network. WUFI claimed dedication to conspiratorial armed struggle but actually had no way to realize it, no intermediate strategy, and no social program. Taiwan Revolutionary Party proclaimed socialism as an ideal, or at least welfare state programs as a goal. It had appeals for the Taiwanese populace.

While Hsu Hsin-liang renewed networks with his supporters in Taiwan, Cary and Patrick set up a safe house in Queens stocked with books from movements around the world, where students and visitors from Taiwan could spend a week or two in quiet reading and in discussions with comrades. A book published in San Francisco describing 100 techniques of non-violent resistance was translated into Chinese and smuggled into Taiwan, perhaps fueling the street battles with police there.

The Commercial Migrants and their Political Culture

Even before martial law was declared over in 1988, 1985/86 or earlier, the style of Taiwanese-American political and cultural life began a subtle evolution. The businessman and hotel-owner migrants kept up much more frequent travel to and from Taiwan, in order to retain their green cards. In terms of political sentiment, these businessmen who had become prosperous under the export economy in the period of Chiang’s Ten Great Projects did not have the same degree of antipathy for all things Chinese (i.e. the rigid northern Confucian culture that the KMT government extolled and subsidized) that the early student migrants had. As the Hokkien-speaking community organizations became more generally accepted and expanded, they also became less politically strident – or rather less in confrontation with the Kuomintang, because they had already won the cultural battle within their communities, and held secure control.

For an early example, in 1984 a young native Taiwanese woman was chosen as Miss China (i.e. for the Republic of China). Ms. Maysing Yang (Yang Huang Mei-hsing) was then the chair of the large Taiwanese community group in Flushing, New York, and wanted to host the visit of this Miss China. Strident independence activists in WUFI rejected this nominal “China” representation, but Maysing, also wife of a prominent community doctor and member of the local Presbyterian church congregation, prevailed. Maysing worked later in networking with local Congressmen for Taiwan causes. The Yang family in the late 1980’s became even more influential by establishing a Taiwanese-American owned bank in Flushing.

In the major population centers of Los Angeles and New York, there were reactions against the shadowy control of WUFI over community organizations through the proxy of its secret members on the boards. Such tight control had been necessary in the past to prevent KMT infiltration, but otherwise it tended to strangle initiatives other than those from WUFI. The “mengwai” (“outside the WUFI alliance”) generally became aligned with Hsu Hsin-liang and in increasingly open contact with the Taiwan dangwai, fast recovering from the 1980 crackdown. Hsu cultivated a coterie of businessmen and community leaders, especially in the San Francisco and Los Angeles areas (“the California gang”), who bankrolled and participated in his projects. Maysing Yang in New York also was within this network.

When the imprisoned hero of the Kaohsiung trials, Shih Ming-deh, wrote an open letter to Chiang Ching-kuo in April 1985 demandng the right to form an opposition party and began an extended hunger strike that almost killed him, his American wife Linda Arrigo and the “California gang” set up a 12-day sympathy hunger strike in front of the Capitol in Washington D.C., July 1985, complete with official police permits. Cary Hong and Patrick Huang prepared
most of the logistics. Hsu Pei-lung, a suave, silver-haired owner of restaurants and real estate, flew in from Los Angeles with the huge banner he had had made to order, “Free Political Prisoners in Taiwan”. Lynn Miles and his Japanese wife kept the vigil for the duration. The FAPA offices provided bed-down for two dozen for a week. WUFI organs engaged in some backbiting, but joined in the final gathering of fifty or so people on the Capital lawn.

In the middle of this activity, the “California gang” decided to rally overseas supporters of the dangwai to push for formation of a formal opposition party in Taiwan, and began networking. Hsu Hsin-liang and two well-known former political prisoners now safe in the U.S. were drafted to play the roles of Ninoy Acquino and Kim Dae-jung – to return to Taiwan and face the martial law regime at their own risk. On May 1, 1986, the Taiwan Democratic Party was announced with considerable fanfare at the Plaza Hotel near the United Nations, and a public list of 200 members who had been given only the briefest telephone notice. The plan was to “take the party back to Taiwan”. US$500,000 was raised as they crisscrossed the States and openly brought couriers from Hsu’s support base in Taoyuan. It was perhaps not coincidental that when a group of prominent dangwai members met at the Grand Hotel in Taipei on September 26, 1986 and announced the formation of an opposition party in defiance of martial law, President Chiang Ching-kuo decided against direct suppression. Fifty or more of Hsu Hsin-liang’s supporters and foreign sympathizers, including many missionaries formerly expelled from Taiwan and former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, boarded planes for Taiwan during the Thanksgiving weekend, 1986 (probably November 30). Some were able to enter Taiwan, but many were turned back or deflected to Hong Kong through Taiwan government demands on the airlines. The Chiang Kai-shek airport in Taoyuan was besieged by 10,000 Hsu supporters in a standoff with thousands of riot police; the scene got prime television time in Hong Kong. Hsu, in disguise, arrived on a plane from the Philippines, but was quickly recognized and stopped from disembarking – on the wanted list, and refused entry. The martial law regime suddenly looked like a paper tiger.

The Right of Return to the Homeland: Taiwanese and Chinese

For the thousands of Taiwanese-Americans who had long been refused return to Taiwan or were under the threat of blacklisting and persecution because of their political affiliations and activities, the right to return to their homeland was an emotional issue. They especially felt heartsick if they had been unable to share parting words with a dying mother or father; some were separated from beloved family members. The impetus of the Taiwan Democratic Party return to Taiwan reflected this personal sentiment as much as a political statement.

This rise of sentiment of return and defiance of the regime had an unexpected effect on the mainland population in Taiwan as well. The old soldiers demonstrated for the right to return to China. Although well-to-do mainlanders had long been secretly visiting China through Hong Kong and third countries, under the “ongoing” civil war with the Chinese communists, such visits could be punished with imprisonment. Up to the 1960’s, military men attempting to return home to China had been shot. Through the 1980’s, opposition figures or their relatives had been implicated through such contacts (e.g. Huang Ni-na, daughter of Huang Hsun-hsin, was sentenced to three years after visiting China). Finally, in 1988, the government de-criminalized visits to China, and there was an outpouring of emotional reunions.

Among some Chinese-Americans that I knew, especially young mainlanders that grew up on Taiwan, I saw a strange about-face in the latter 1980’s: whereas previously they had upheld the superiority of pure Chinese culture over low-class Taiwanese custom, and vehemently opposed Taiwan independence, after their parents had visited their home villages in China and been shoked down by relatives they hardly knew existed (and sometimes suspected to be manufactured), they began to talk fondly about “our Taiwan” and to denigrate the crudity and crassness of those raised in China under communism. Although not more than a few could bring themselves to approve of Taiwanese political identity, their attitude became closer to a
passive or disparaging “Go ahead and go for independence, if you dare.” Most had no more relatives living on Taiwan.

In the United States there are many associations of Mandarin Chinese speakers for church and recreational activities, including groups that mixed mainlanders and native Taiwanese, but to my knowledge these rarely took on much more than a passive role in support of the KMT. This is not totally surprising, because many of those who fled the communists in 1949 were also strongly critical of the Chinese nationalists and Chiang Kai-shek, or even were themselves under threat during the White Terror. My impression is that most migrant mainlanders have not looked back to Taiwan. Nor have they done much to support the democratic movement in China and its exile groups, certainly nothing comparable to the strong and organized support of overseas native Taiwanese for the democratic movement in their homeland.

The second generation of the mainland migrants from Taiwan have continued the cultural and political proclivities of their parents, with central interest in China, and apathy for the long-term fate of Taiwan. But their parents’ strong anti-communism and the relative safety of Taiwan have often propelled them back in the 1990’s for advanced studies in Chinese in Taiwan (e.g. with the U.S.-directed study abroad program Council for International Educational Exchange, which runs three study locations in China and one in Taipei), and thence for a few to a more critical re-evaluation of the Kuomintang legacy than their parents might like.

Three-Way Confrontation: ROC, PRC, Taiwanese

The arrival of increasing numbers of students and visiting bureaucrats from the Peoples Republic of China in the United States by the late 1980’s set off a reaction that shifted the lines of identification for migrants and travelers from Taiwan, “The Republic of China”. The visiting bureaucrats appeared to be openly venal, bustling off to plan for their personal business deals as soon as they concluded their mediocre academic presentations, the ostensible reason for the visit. Many U.S. graduate programs, especially those in the social sciences where future employment was uncertain, found that their graduate students from the PRC were moonlighting in restaurants, avoided difficult or “politically dangerous” topics of research, and only stayed on campus as long as their scholarships lasted; few completed the degree. All PRC visitors in the U.S. at the time of the June 1989 Tien’anmen massacre were allowed indefinite stay by the U.S. authorities, and many Chinese professors gleefully took up manual labor in hopes of saving to bring over their families to this golden world of opportunity.

Both native Taiwanese and mainlanders from Taiwan felt at pains to distinguish themselves from the grasping tactics of the PRC migrants to the U.S. and Europe, and even more from the downtrodden laborers smuggled in by the Fujian “snake-heads”. Even in Africa, the PRC peddlers who undercut African traders gave being “Chinese” a bad connotation.

In political debate at quasi-academic events, Taiwanese had just begun in the 1980’s to be able to challenge the assumptions of Chinese nationalism in presentations by scholars that took Kuomintang domination as given; in the following years, the presence of PRC proponents made a three-way debate that began to push the KMT and Taiwan independence advocates towards the same corner.

A parallel development proceeded in foreign relations. Given that the official offices of the Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the United States, the Taipei Economic and Cultural Offices, that granted visas, etc., were not allowed to have contact with U.S. officials, the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), with its strong constituency base of Taiwanese-Americans, was within a few years after its founding able to make more impact on Congress that the ROC MOFA, despite FAPA’s minimal funding and few paid staff, usually
about three. Though FAPA and MOFA were originally in direct conflict on almost all issues, the increasing power of China gradually forced MOFA into some reluctant implicit acceptance of FAPA, long before the Democratic Progressive Party took over the Taiwan presidency in the year 2000.

By the 1990’s the Taiwanese-Americans were clearly aligned with the Republican Party; few liberal figures or Democrats expressed concern for Taiwan’s future. Even Senator Jesse Helms, champion of right-wing “freedom fighters” like RENAMO and long a friend of the Chiangs, came into the good graces of FAPA. Dr. Parris Chang, formerly a consultant for the Rand Corporation, was sent by the Democratic Progressive Party in 1995 to head its new representative office in Washington, D.C. while he also served as National Legislator representing the overseas Taiwanese. He continued his close ties with conservative American institutions such as the Heritage Foundation and the Foreign Affairs Research Institute, and invited former CIA directors to make presentations at the DPP office. Clinton’s declarations to China further alienated Taiwanese opinion. In the years following the 2000 election of the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian to the Presidency, it seems unavoidable that the diplomacy of Taiwanese and Taiwanese-Americans follows in the footsteps of the Kuomintang and its World Anti-Communist League. But I am getting ahead of the story here.

Taiwanese-Americans Back in Taiwan: Breaking Through the Blacklist

The right to return to Taiwan was not easily achieved for those Taiwanese-Americans on the blacklist. Some could get through the immigration gate by changing the spelling of their names on their American passports, e.g. to Taiwanese pronunciation, after the standard legal name change procedures. Some even borrowed the passport of a similar-looking sibling or friend, for a brief visit. But this did not always fool the security agents; the overseas activist might find himself trailed and under surveillance night and day, and so cut his trip short in fear of arrest.

In the years 1989-91, the overseas activists became bolder. The trick was for the well-known members of a seditious Taiwan independence overseas organization to appear suddenly on stage at a huge DPP rally, and then melt away before the police could close in – as when Guo Pei-hong, WUFI youth organizer and later USA chairman, appeared in a stadium, and paper masks with his face were worn by all the audience on their way out. Those on the blacklist or wanted list trying to charge through the airport in 1988-91 were sometimes apprehended and some spent up to eight months in jail – but in the new political environment they were finally charged with illegal entry rather than sedition. Peter Huang (Huang Wen-hsiung), the Cornell graduate student in sociology who had attempted to assassinate Chiang Ching-kuo in New York in April 1970, jumped bail, and been on the lam for thirty years, suddenly appeared in Taiwan. After a brief detention, he was charged with unauthorized entry, which he challenged legally. The same for the old Chinese Communist Party-trained Taiwanese revolutionary Shih Ming, who returned in about 1994.

After 1992 the crucial democratic breakthroughs in Taiwan made it possible for the blacklisted overseas Taiwanese to go back to their homeland without much fear of serious KMT retribution – although there are claims that Wang Kang-lu’s fatal traffic accident wasn’t an accident. Return to Taiwan was another challenge for those who had spent so much of their lives, outside of their routine professional jobs in American society, dedicated to the cause of their homeland. Now close to retirement age, many Taiwanese-Americans left their wives (rarely, husbands) in their spacious suburban homes and threw themselves into the continuing struggle for democratic process and Taiwanese nationalism in Taiwan. I remember seeing Chen Ying-chan, for so many years the “Johnny Carson” of the Taiwan Center in Flushing, in 1991/92 running an underground radio station out of a cramped apartment in Shihlin; his personal quarters were a rickety aluminum-frame sofa for a bed, and a plastic-cloth wardrobe to hold a few suits. Hundreds of such returned Taiwanese-Americans
became the middle-level legions for the new Democratic Progressive Party, receiving little or no compensation for their work. The sacrifice of their personal lives, and, I would wonder, possibly alienation from their spouses, seemed to be no matter for comment; they returned to the United States for a few weeks perhaps two or three times a year. Within a few years back in Taiwan, they seemed to almost forget how to speak English.

Many conventional and politically middle-of-the-road Taiwanese-American returnees, including Ms. Maysing Yang who served in DPP foreign relations long before the year 2000, were swept into government service as part of the DPP’s gradual ascent to power. The returnees, with their Ph.D.’s and American career experience, provided a veneer of professionalism for the DPP that brought its image up a notch, to compete with the much-educated KMT career politicians. They also were not beholden to the local factions and their patronage machines that held back Taiwan’s politics at a low level of ideology. In office they applied American management techniques and streamlining to the bloated and lax KMT bureaucracy along with their promotion of Taiwanese identity and nationalism. One such luminary was Mark Chen (Chen Tang-shan), who with his over two decades of experience in the civil service in Washington D.C. was elected chief executive of Tainan County, and found that a third of local government personnel were redundant.

A more unusual case was that of Jimmy Tan. At age fifteen, he went along with his father, an escaped political prisoner, in a perilous flight from Taiwan in 1975 on a small fishing launch. They received political asylum in the U.S., but under economic duress Jimmy was abandoned by his father and became a vagrant. Still, he managed to finish high school and attend an engineering college. Meanwhile, he was deeply involved in the 1980-82 ideological struggles for a national liberation movement definition of Taiwan nationalism. Later Jimmy jettisoned his lucrative career in research at Bell Labs, Murray Hill, New Jersey, to return to Taiwan in 1991. With a hidden personal history that included radical Taiwan independence groups, training with the Guardian in England and international youth camps in Moscow, Jimmy first threw himself into ultra-nationalist groups with lumpen proletariat legions that physically confronted the riot police during protests. But he became disillusioned with the selfishness of his comrades. Then he was drafted to serve as a computer specialist at DPP headquarters under Hsu Hsin-liang, and he observed how the party membership lists were stuffed and manipulated by party factions in the primaries. He worked for the Taiwan Independence Party when it split off from the DPP in late 1996, and re-learned how to write Chinese in the process. After he went through his Bell Labs savings, he got a job as a factory manager where he found he had to force the workers to accept unionization and health benefits, as well as stop pilfering. A few years later, as an employee for an American company, he restyled himself as an American expat who just wanted to drink and disco. Full circle.

The life of Jimmy Tan as a leftist Taiwanese nationalist is out of the mold, though not unique. But since socialist ideals emerged in ideological debate for this generation together with the Chinese nationalism of the Diaoyutai Movement, in general the Taiwanese both in Taiwan and abroad equate leftist political ideology with Chinese nationalism. The Diaoyutai Movement, though predominantly an overseas student movement in 1970-71, was significant in Taiwan in the form of the China Tide magazine (Hsia Chao), which championed issues of social justice in 1975-79 and helped rally both mainlander and Taiwanese intellectuals to the democratic movement that challenged the KMT. Pro-PRC descendants of the Diaoyutai Movement live on in contemporary Taiwan, namely in the form of the Labour Party (Lao Dung Dang), which is now only half-hearted about its socialist rhetoric, while it promotes a strident Chinese nationalism and even works for the campaigns of old regime diehards like Feng Fu-hsiang. It serves as the social movement token for the Kuomintang in its new role as opposition, though its main figures in Taiwan, notably the writer Chen Ying-zhen, were political prisoners at one time. It might appear now to be a dead end, though it still holds camps for youth, e.g. to steer them to universities in the PRC, and holds rallies to protest the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
Looking back now, we can see that most of the native Taiwanese overseas who did take the socialism/Chinese nationalism route in 1970, and even up through the 1980’s, have since realigned themselves with Taiwan identity, and/or have concluded that they must realize their ideals of social justice in the practical environment of modern Taiwan. For example, Lin Shiao-Shin, the China-leaning founder of the Organization in Support of the Democratic Movement in Taiwan (centered in Chicago in 1979-early 80’s), has over the last seven years been a major figure in the development of the community college network, 105 sites in all now, that harbors environmental and local heritage and other community activists of all stripes. Or, with the socialist models in shambles and capitalism unchallenged in affluent Taiwan, the early socialist ideologues have turned to focus on merely professional and personal life, including retirement plans.

Taiwan’s Hi-Tech, Reverse Migration, and International Capital Flows in the 1990’s

Outside of political circles as well, the 1990’s were a period of reverse migration. Thousands of Taiwanese trained and employed for a few years abroad returned for the electronics and other high-tech industries. This reflected new patterns of employment opportunities and a changing standard of living within Taiwan, that is, quality of life almost comparable to the United States for the technocrat elite, but jobs perhaps easier to find if you were willing to work a 60-hour week. Those recruited to these industries, probably mostly in their early thirties, included Chinese-speakers with varied ethnic and mixed backgrounds, i.e. born anywhere from Africa to South America to Southeast Asia (some Chinese had trading and business networks in Africa, as did Indians, and their children were generally well educated and moved on to developed countries). With English the standard of communication in technical fields, national identity among them could be very mixed and fluid. However, with Taiwan becoming the powerhouse for production of consumer electronics for the world market, and Taiwanese capitalists controlling also plants in the US Silicon Valley and elsewhere, this industry could not but be infused with a sense of pride in Taiwan and its technical prowess. The Hsinchu Science Park, Taiwan’s government-sponsored version of Silicon Valley, has been the main home to this technical elite, and also the scene of educational innovation, because the parents wanted more for their young children than Taiwan’s authoritarian school system, and also they wanted their children to be educated in English. Here programs of creative home and cooperative schooling were started by the wives of the engineers.

In the 1990’s, with Taiwan an advanced consumer society, the nature of adult Taiwanese migration to the United States, Canada, Australia, and even South Africa became increasingly tied to international business and finance flows. The 1970’s class of small Taiwanese manufacturers/exporters had matured to become the owners and managers of multinational corporations. By the late 1980’s much of the physical manufacturing of low-tech export goods was removed from Taiwan and shifted to Southeast Asia and especially China, to take advantage of lower labor costs. The labor-intensive operations of the higher-tech electronics gradually followed as well. In the case of South Africa and some of the less-developed southeast Asian countries, low-tech manufacturing for the local market could be set up with cast-off equipment now obsolete by Taiwan standards, e.g. hand-operated knitting machines, if labor costs were very low. This was the development in South Africa in 1980, as Taiwan stepped in to invest in the black “homelands” at the invitation of its white apartheid ally, just as international embargoes were beginning to take effect. Taiwanese were granted honorary white status, and they lived in guarded compounds with black maids like whites did, and their guard dogs barked at blacks, but not at whites or Asians. Aside from this they would set up little Taiwanese noodle shops in them also for their neighbors, reproducing some of the gregarious habits of Taiwanese night markets. [15]

The late 80’s saw another wave of anti-immigration sentiment in the States. In about 1991 the regulations for business immigration into the country were tightened up. Aside from money investment, the applicant had to demonstrate that he had created ten “employment
opportunities”. This was a trickier prospect. One investor bought land in Florida, but was misled about the employment effect. Another developed a fruit orchard in Lancaster, California, but failed to pass the grade for creating ten jobs because half the farm workers were illegal Mexicans. However, Taiwanese could generally still manage to manufacture the documentation, say by buying out a current restaurant operation or a car repair shop. [16]

These entrepreneurs, even relatively smaller ones, could afford to buy huge houses around Vancouver, for example, while still running the businesses based in Taiwan that had provided the nest egg. Compared to Taiwan prices for land and modern housing, those in North America seemed a bargain. Usually the wife went along with the high school-age children, but in at least a few cases it was the wife who had the head for business, and the husband played house in the U.S. The spouses would spend only a few weeks out of the year together. I once heard a wife lament that she passed her years like a widow. In this kind of migration, the luxurious house in North America with front lawn and back yard was slated to be a retirement home as well, for relatively young retirees who traveled frequently back to Taiwan and toured Europe just for family events and leisure. In the 1990’s, the new Taiwanese migrants have been more and more affluent, some taking up no vocation other than speculation in real estate and the stock market. They decorate their houses extravagantly. There are stories of such migrants buying fancy new sports cars for their teenage sons, only to see some spectacular crackup in the first week.

The “Little Study-Abroad Students”, 1991

However, until recent years boys were not supposed to be allowed to leave Taiwan until they had completed military service, with a standard of three years service for graduating high school students. Many parents wanted both to take their children out of the sterile, examination-ridden education system and to help their sons evade military service. Incidentally, Taiwan then had rates of fatalities among recruits, in the absence of combat, that were among the highest in the world. According to one immigration counselor, approval for going abroad just for the purpose of tourism was not fully opened up until 1988, and even then, until 1991, minors could not have a passport of their own; they could only be attached to the passport of a parent, which limited their options. So 1991 marks the advent of a new kind of student, the “little study-abroad student”.

The Taiwanese students studying abroad below college level have been referred to as “little study-abroad students” (xiao liu xue sheng). With tuitions rising in Taiwan and job qualification inflation, plus the internationalization of business demanding English, many well-to-do parents in Taiwan sent their teenagers and young-twenties children off to short-term programs of English study in the United States, or even high school exchange programs, so they would be precociously proficient in English. A few child prodigies have been sent to Europe to cultivate their musical talent.

A great number managed to effectively migrate without legal immigration procedures. Once residing at the address of a relative or friend in the United States, which they could demonstrate to the school administration with telephone or utility bills, they could attend public primary and high schools without tuition. In California, Act 187 was passed with the intention of clearing illegal immigrant children out of the schools, to decrease the burden on the school system; but under protest from immigrant groups, it could not be carried through. By November 30, 1997, when American immigration policy finally underwent changes, it was estimated that there were over 16,000 such students from Taiwan in the United States.

Since November 30, 1997, those who have neither citizenship nor green card do not have the right to attend public schools. However, that does not mean they cannot attend private schools, such as religious schools or boarding schools, at the high school or prep school level. Virtually all applications for F-1 visas to attend these schools are approved. However, the
parents must foot the bill, about US$30,000 a year. After completion of college, it is a matter of course that a one-year work training visa will be approved, but only about one-fifth are approved for an H-1 work visa beyond that. At a higher educational level, masters degree or Ph.D., the rate of approval is perhaps half. [8]

The “Little Study-Abroad Students” Grown Up: Multiplicity of Identities

By the early 90’s, the pattern of the poor but hardworking rural Taiwan student making good as a graduate student in the United States was long gone. Taiwanese were no longer privileged in their access to U.S. scholarships; now the scholarships went to PRC students. The Taiwanese had hard currency, and they were expected to pay their own way. In fact many small liberal arts colleges and technical schools in the U.S. courted the Taiwan market, and it might be suspected that they could only stay afloat because of this influx of paying students. More than half of the graduates of American engineering schools have been non-citizens; the U.S. might have come to depend on this source of technical talent as well.

By the late 1990’s the “little study-abroad scholars” had matured through college into a segment in the generation that was truly multi-cultural: virtually native proficiency in both English and Chinese, including reading and writing characters. They have also commonly had double citizenship, and if they left Taiwan before the age of military service for men, they may be subject to arrest during visits to Taiwan for failure to report for duty. Currently, they may return twice a year, but if they stay more than two months, the military duty requirement kicks in. An organization in Taiwan called Parents Society of Overseas Students is concerned with their complex migration and citizenship issues, and there have been hearings in the National Legislature on the issue of their military service.

The little study-abroad students may be more dependent on their parents’ wealth than the second generation Taiwanese-Americans. Returning to Taiwan to inherit the family business, say after a decade of study abroad in their early formative years, they may also face more of a generation gap and a cultural gap, since their parents, say the newly-rich Taiwanese small businessman type, have not been acclimated to Western society. But given the geographical mobility and affluence of their parents, they have been well placed to set the Asian trends in technology and international investment relatively early in their careers, with or without the advanced degrees that allowed the brain drain generation access to secure jobs abroad.

The Second Generation of the Early Brain-Drain Taiwanese-Americans

The second generation of the early Taiwanese migrants to the United States, now many in their thirties, has mixed into the general ethnic melting pot of American society in terms of schooling and employment, but their average income was far above the average, even above the average for whites. I know only one of this generation to have married a black, and then of course with dismay from the parents. Intermarriage with whites was not uncommon, but parents still preferred in-laws that they could relate to, i.e. not mainlanders and preferably Hokkien-speaking. Some of the second generation made considerable effort to maintain their identity and associations as Taiwanese-American, not entirely submerged within the category of Chinese-American. The Intercollegiate Taiwan-American Student Association (ITASA), formed by 1990 and with one of its early weekend camps/parties held at Princeton University, worked towards this. Within a few years it had regional chapters and activities at many campuses around the United States, especially at Northwestern. A large part of the program was to keep up on political events and cultural expressions from Taiwan, but the medium of communication was largely English. Several years later there were spin-off organizations of young Taiwanese-American professionals.
Members of this generation have also played some role in Taiwan political development, at least as reflected through its international relations, helping to produce booklets and documentaries in English presenting the native Taiwanese view of the Republic of China. Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA) early on had a program for sponsoring young Taiwanese-Americans as U.S. congressional pages. They would be provided housing at the FAPA offices during their internships; a second adjacent brownstone walkup was bought a few years after FAPA’s founding. Annette Lu (Lu Hsiu-lien, now VP) continually recruited young Taiwanese-American women to serve in her entourage from the mid-1980’s on, with her trendy edge of feminism and pretensions to savvy on international affairs.

One of her protégés was Bikhim Hsiao (Hsiao Mei-chin in Mandarin). Bikhim is the daughter of Hsiao Ching-fen, the head of Tainan Presbyterian Seminary for a few years shortly after 1979 when it was a hotbed of opposition activity; he was forced to migrate to the States, for his own safety. Born in Taiwan, Bikhim was 12 when the family moved. Her mother is white American, and the family lived in Monte Claire, New Jersey. Educated at Oberlin, Bikhim came out of college with a strident feminism and radical internationalism. Later she studied political science at Columbia. She is totally fluent in Hokkien, Mandarin, and English. At the DPP headquarters foreign affairs department in the late 1990’s, she wore khaki cotton, trench boots, and a sawed-off haircut, as if to deny her slight frame, shyness, and pale Caucasian beauty. After serving as President Chen’s translator, and thence reluctantly becoming the focus of public attention, she was elected to the national legislature to represent “overseas Chinese”, and has worked seriously at that job.

This example illustrates the growing cosmopolitanism and global chic of modern Taipei, at least among the elite; racial mixture is hardly cause for comment, and Singapore is the ideal for English proficiency that should allow Taiwan to become the entrepot of the world. The anti-foreign Chinese purism of the old Kuomintang is fast fading in the educational system, despite regulations designed to maintain it. Paradoxically, nationality is increasingly blurred even as Taiwanese nationalism coalesces.

NOTES

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ROMANIZATION: I regret that the romanization of Chinese and Taiwanese names in this article is not consistent. With names, I have tried to use either the spelling as used by the person, or simplified Taiwan-style romanization. For translation of terms, I have used mostly Hanyu pinyin.

[1] At the end of World War II, Taiwan had a population of about six million native Taiwanese, of which about three-quarters were Hokkien-speaking and one-quarter Hakka-speaking, plus small numbers of indigenous people. The collapse of the Republic of China in 1949 brought a refugee population of over one million, including perhaps half a million troops (military secret), so predominantly adult male. In the 1960’s, “mainlanders” were reported to be 13-15% of the population.

[2] My experience which contributes to this article is: as a student of anthropology and sociology as well as a participant in the women’s liberation movement of the early 1970’s, I have often discussed personal life issues with younger and older Taiwanese immigrants to the
United States. I was deeply involved in Taiwanese-American political activities in the 1980’s. Finally taken off Taiwan’s blacklist and allowed to return in May 1990 when Shih Ming-deh was released from prison, I assisted in some of the foreign affairs activities of the Democratic Progressive Party. In the 1990’s I was often invited to speak at Taiwanese-American summer camps and meetings of ITASA (Intercollegiate Taiwanese-American Student Association). After finishing my Ph.D., I re-established residence in Taiwan in 1997. Among others, since then I have taught Taiwan students preparing to study in the U.S. with the Taiwan extension program of the University of Colorado at Denver, 1999, and served as Director for the Taipei Study Center of the Council on International Educational Exchange, 2000-2001.

[2] I interviewed Chen Chung-tung in 2003. He has published his memoirs, first in Japanese based on the detailed notes he kept in prison on very thin paper, and then in Chinese, Sheng Ming De Guan Huai (Concern for Life), June 2002, ISBN 957-30617-1-6. The book is most easily obtained from him personally, Tel: (02) 2249-3353. The final list of political prisoners was smuggled out by Tsai Tsai-yuan and Hsieh Tsung-min in 1971, both of whom suffered severe torture in retaliation.


[4] Lu Hsiu-lien’s articles were mentioned, for example, in a description of her career, China Times March 8, 2001. Also see www.womenet.org.tw/peng/chang.html. This account of the Chung Chao-man case comes from my personal acquaintance with the couple and participation in the Taiwanese-American community in San Diego at that time.

[5] Tony Coolidge’s indigenous culture festival in Florida was enthusiastically assisted by Taiwan Clubs in Orlando, Florida, and indigenous dancers were sent from Taiwan with government funding. The Austronesian indigenous people of Taiwan who predate the large Chinese migrations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are now identified as less than 3% of the population, though they may have provided a large fraction of the bloodline as they were assimilated. They are important in contemporary cultural identity, providing a rationale for dissent from the Peoples Republic of China claims to sovereignty over Taiwan due to common racial ancestry. However, before the 1990’s they had no noticeable separate role in Taiwan’s overseas communities or international relations.


[7] The establishment of the Taiwan Center in Flushing, New York is described in detail in Yang Yuan-hsun, see Note [3] above for citation; especially in two interviews, p. 79-115. Patrick Huang was central in pulling together the funding in a community gathering in November 1982. The Taiwan Center was especially endangered in its first decade because of its association with Taiwan independence activities, i.e. the KMT organizations intimidated participants; but it still survived several financial crises.


[9] The Road to Freedom: Taiwan’s Postwar Human Rights Movement. ISBN 986-80776-0-5. December 2004. Published by Chen Wen-chen Memorial Foundation. Taipei, Taiwan. cwc1950@ms72.hinet.net. See p. 150 concerning Chen Yu-hsi case; p. 12 concerning Chen Wen-chen case. Also my own visit with Chen Wen-chen a few months before his death.

[11] The newsletter Taiwan Communiqué continued until 2003, and is available online, www.taiwandc.org. It is the only source in English that reported regularly in such detail on repression in Taiwan. Lynn Miles founded the International Committee in Defense of Human Rights in Taiwan (ICDHRT) in Osaka in 1975, and set up a network of American, Canadian, and Japanese helpers to smuggle information in and out of Taiwan. I was part of this network residing in Taiwan from early 1977 on, but was deported from Taiwan on December 15, 1979, following the Kaohsiung Incident.


[14] For much of the description of the commercial migrants, the “little study-abroad students” and the legal stipulations influencing the pattern of migration, I am indebted to Johnny Huang (Huang Yu-chi), an immigration consultant, and founder of Parents Society of Overseas Students. He has also been active in educational reform in Taiwan. Contact: psos@ms12.hinet.net, Tel: (02) 2826-3637, Fax: 2826-3738. Some of the specifics of business immigration regulations have been provided by Robert Fang (Fang Tao-Chuang) of E&C Overseas Enterprises, Tel: (02) 8732-8179, www.enc.com.tw.


[16] Again, information thanks to Johnny Huang (Huang Yu-chi), as in Note [14].

Related articles and manuscripts by Linda Gail Arrigo:


Muckraker! An Overall Critique of the Taiwan Opposition Movement. (Book in Chinese, Jidang! Taiwan Fandui Yundong de Dzong Pipan. Published by Avanguard (Chien-wei), Taipei, 1997. Named one of ten best books of 1997 by Taiwan Pen. This translation of Linda Arrigo's

Other Sources:


The Road to Freedom: Taiwan’s Postwar Human Rights Movement. ISBN 986-80776-0-5. December 2004. Published by Chen Wen-chen Memorial Foundation. Taipei, Taiwan. cwc1950@ms72.hinet.net